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Tumultuous times can be particularly difficult for the vulnerable. That
may be no less true in the international tax context than it is elsewhere, but
disruptive change can also open the door to greater participation by, and
rewards for, those long treated as outsiders. With international tax
cooperation's first golden age receding into history, new priorities have
begun to take root. Unprecedented challenges buffet the international tax
regime, suggesting that its future may depend less on its capacity to shield
businesses from taxation than on its ability to find common ground among
very different states.
International tax cooperation has long held a potent appeal even for
states with outsized influence and power.' Resting on a patchwork quilt of
mismatched national tax systems, international tax rules have drawn strength
from states' willingness to make generous concessions to one another. When
an investment or a business spans a border, two sovereigns could assert
competing tax claims on the resulting profits.2 Surprisingly often, they have
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See Michael J. Graetz, Taxing InternationalIncome: InadequatePrinciples, Outdated Concepts
and Unsatisfactory Policies, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1357, 1390 (2001) ("At least since the 1920s, the
international tax policy of the United States has been premised on the idea that we can improve our lot

through multilateral cooperation and agreement.").
2 See Tsilly Dagan, The Tax Treaties Myth, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 939, 942 (2000) ("The
classic case of double taxation arises when a resident of one country produces income in another country
and is subject to tax on that income by both her country of residence as well as the country in which her
income is earned (the host country). Double taxation is often cited as a major obstacle to unfettered
economic progress."); Eric M. Zolt, Tax Treaties and Developing Countries, 72 TAx L. REV. 111, 1 15
(2018) ("For countries to realize the benefits from cross-border activity, they need to ensure that the total
taxes imposed (by them and other countries) are not so high as to make engaging in these activities

economically unattractive. If two countries have the right to tax an activity or investment, and each
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not.: Precisely the reverse can be true, with states treating the right to tax like
a hot potato. 4
In the wake of the Great Recession that followed the 2008 financial
crisis, the once-robust neoliberal consensus that sustained that cooperative
approach began to fray.5 The reciprocal deference to the claims of other states
that once delighted scholars and served as a boon to international commerce
has come to seem anachronistic.' As the enormous subsidies it delivers to
multinationals have come into focus, the call for shared sacrifice to produce
7
collective benefits through economic growth ring increasingly hollow.

imposes tax at a significant tax rate (say 35%), then the very high pretax rate of return required for an

investment to be economically viable will result in relatively little cross-border activity.").
'See Allison Christians,Sovereignty, Taxation and Social Contract, 18 MINN. J. INT'L L. 99, 110
n.31 (2009) (describing "double non-taxation" or "the simultaneous non-taxation by multiple
jurisdictions" as when "each country . . . refrain[s] from exercising an otherwise appropriate jurisdiction
to tax, either out of deference to the other (arguably respecting the other's sovereign entitlement) or to
attract foreign investment (arguably respecting its own sovereign entitlement not to tax")); Graetz, supra

note

1, at

1364.

a In the E.U. state aid cases against Apple and others, the United States and Ireland fought for the
right not to tax. See Ruth Mason, Identifying Illegal Subsidies, 69 AM. U. L. REV. 479, 516-22 (2019)
(explaining why, even as a theoretical matter, neither Ireland nor the United States could be compelled to
tax Apple's profits); Daniel Shaviro, Friends Without Benefits? Treasuy and EU State Aid, 83 TAX
NOTES INT'L 1067, 1079 (2016) (suggesting that U.S. resistance to Apple paying tax reflects the reality

that "U.S. multinationals' influence" is "more likely to be too strong than too weak").
'See Jeremy Leaman & Attiya Waris, Introduction: Why Tax Justice Matters in Global Economic
Development, in TAX JUSTICE AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM, 1945 TO THE

PRESENT 1, 1 (Jeremy Leaman & Attiya Waris eds., 2013) (noting that in the wake of the 2008 financial
crisis-long tolerated in the name of neoliberalism-the problems posed by corporate tax avoidance and
by tax competition with low-tax jurisdictions "have now only been deemed worrying because their
contribution to the global crises and their associated destruction of wealth and social equilibrium has
become palpable").
e Rebecca M. Kysar, Unravelingthe Tax Treaty, 104 MINN. L. REV. 1755, 1756 (2020) ("Although
tax treaties may have, at one time, served salutary purposes, modern circumstances call into question their
necessity. ... Instead of alleviating double taxation .. , treaties are the means to achieve double nontaxation."). Underlying the skepticism of that deference is the threat of too little tax, which would violate
what Professor Reuven Avi-Yonah calls the "single tax principle." See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Who

Invented the Single Tax Principle:An Essay on the History of U.S. Treaty Policy, 59 N.Y. L. SUH. L. REV.
305, 306 (2014).

See Graetz, supra note 1, at 1363 ("Frequently, the normative and policy discussions of
international income taxation in the literature, including not only the academic publications of both
economists and lawyers, but also-and perhaps most importantly most of the key serious government
analyses containing any normative discussion, begin and end with an assumption--not an argument-that

the proper goal for U.S. international tax policy is advancing worldwide economic efficiency.").
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International tax cooperation's longstanding success came because ofnot despite-its lofty aspirations. The question of why states obey
international law can be a puzzle. Legitimacy-and the compliance pull it
exerts over states-offers one answer that explains the perseverance of the
international tax regime.8 Simply put, influential states harnessed legal
instruments with sterling pedigrees to contain a compelling threat to the
world's collective welfare. 9 Fueled by the legitimacy generated by states'
formal embrace of its pursuit of collective benefits, international tax
cooperation grew strong.
Over the last two decades, shared sacrifice has yielded to centralized
authority.1 0 The dawn of a new golden age of international tax cooperation
will require more, a higher purpose worthy of the vast shared undertaking it
represents. One path forward would be to shape international tax rules to
deliver benefits principally to the least well-off states.1 ' Such an approachTax Sparing 2.0-would revive a proud history of mission-driven
international tax cooperation, helping to restore its lost legitimacy.' 2

'See Steven A. Dean, Neither Rules nor Standards, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 537, 561-62 (2011)
(discussing the role and sources of legitimacy and compliance pull in the international tax regime).

9

The League of Nations developed the bilateral treaties that would ultimately be replicated

thousands of times to form the core of today's international tax regime. See SUNITA JOGARAJAN, DOUBLE
TAXATION AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 3-4 (2018).
IS The OECD Secretariat, for example, has begun to play an increasingly central role. Allison
Christians, A UnifiedApproach to InternationalTax Consensus, 96 TAX NOTES INT'L 497, 497 (2019)
(noting that "it is unlike the vast majority of tax work undertaken by the OECD in that it expressly declines

to represent the views of the 36 member states, let alone the 134 inclusive framework members").
"

See TSILLY DAGAN, INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY: BETWEEN COMPETITION AND COOPERATION

189 (2018) (concluding that for "a multilateral regime established through cooperation to be justified it
must improve (or at least not worsen) the welfare of the least well-off citizens in all the cooperating
states"); Press Release, Economic and Social Council, Corporate Tax Reform Must Focus on Developing
Countries' Needs, Combating Inequality, Speakers Tell Special Meeting of Economic and Social Council,
U.N. Press Release ECOSOC/6978 (Apr. 19, 2019) ("However, any reform of tax rules must pay special
attention to the needs of developing countries ...

[A]ny new measures must work towards a fair system

that reduces inequalities.").
2See Arthur Cockficld, The Limits of the International Tax Regime as a Commitment Projector,
33 VA. TAX REV. 59, 70 (2013) (concluding that the international tax regime's "initial purpose" was "to

promote peace and prosperity").
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I. INTERNATIONAL TAX COOPERATION

When a business extends its reach beyond its home state, it does so to
seize a profit opportunity. Absent some form of accommodation, the
additional earnings resulting from that expansion might be subject to the
income tax of both the venture's home jurisdiction and its new host
jurisdiction. International tax rules provide a series of imperfect-and
generous-responses to that potential burden.
Simply by virtue of its default rules, the U.S. income tax allows a
venture to deduct taxes paid to a host state just like other business expenses,
such as electricity or rent.' The U.S. income tax goes further, affording
foreign income taxes a special status that most business costs do not enjoy.
Our hypothetical cross-border business could, within limits, credit each
dollar of foreign taxes against a dollar of its U.S. tax obligations, a more
4
favorable result than deducting the taxes would provide.'
In a rough-and-tumble world, the foreign tax credit seems an anomaly.
5
States do not routinely subsidize other sovereigns.' Yet the foreign tax credit
does just that, assuring ventures, like the newly expanded business described
above, that if the host state collects $1 of income tax, the United States will
reduce the U.S. tax owed by $1. Even more remarkably, the U.S. foreign tax
6
credit forgoes any requirement of reciprocity.'
An elaborate edifice was built atop such domestic laws in the form of
bilateral tax treaties. Those treaties formalized the generosity implicit in the
foreign tax credit into a gentlemen's agreement governing the taxation of
cross-border transactions that traces its roots back to the League of Nations.

" Those offsets allow an income tax to tax income, rather than gross receipts. I.R.C. § 164(a)(3)
(allowing a deduction for "[s]tate and local, and foreign, income, war profits, and excess profits taxes").
14 Graetz and O'Hear detail the origins on the foreign tax credit and the unique historical
circumstances in which it arose. Michael J. Gractz & Michael M. O'Hear, The "OriginalIntent" of U.S.
InternationalTaxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021, 1043-54 (1997).

" Within a single state, such subsidies are less surprising. Bonds issued by state and local
governments, for example, enjoy an exemption from federal income tax, allowing those govermments to
borrow more cheaply than they otherwise would: See I.R.C. § 103.
" Of course, the circumstances under which the tax credit came into existence were extraordinary.
The credit was enacted in the need to rebuild Europe after WWI. See Graetz & O'Hcar, supra note 14, at

1043-54.
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Born out of a Progressive Era impulse to create mechanisms responsive to
the "upheaval of industrialization" and "the growing anxiety that existing
political institutions were incapable of overcoming [that] challenge," those
double tax treaties embody optimism in the face of daunting challenges.' 7
Over time, those treaties succeeded not simply because of the material
benefits they delivered to signatories, but because they bolstered the
legitimacy of international tax rules.' 8

II. LEGITIMACY AND THE INTERNATIONAL TAX REGIME
In many respects, international law presents a puzzle. Given that it is
"supported by so little coercive authority[,]" one might easily conclude that
"the surprising thing about international law is that nations ever obey its
strictures or carry out its mandates."' 9 Recent history, from Brexit to the U.S.
withdrawal from the World Health Organization, offers a stark reminder that
a state cannot be compelled to cooperate with another state, and that appeal
to global or even national welfare may fail to bind a state to a cooperative
arrangement.2 0 Humbling delays in the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) effort to bring consensus to the
taxation of digital businesses underscores that troublesome reality2

17 SABEEL K. RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY AGAINST DOMINATION 54 (2016). Rahman identifies one of
the four economists often credited with the regime's creation, Seligman, as one of the "Progressive Era
reformists" who "sought to overcome the challenges of industrial capitalism not only by proposing

alternative economic arrangements, but more importantly by developing new mechanisms and institutions

to empower citizens to better contest the exercise of economic and political power." Id. at 55, 67.
" The popularity and ubiquity of bilateral tax treaties cannot be explained by the benefits
they
provide to states, either developing or developed. See Kysar, supranote 6, at 1832 (showing that treaties
may harm developed as well as developing states).
'9

Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the InternationalSystem, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 705, 705 (1988).

20 See Eric A. Posner, Liberal Internationalismand the Populist Backlash, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 795,
795-96 (2017) (discussing instances of populist backlash to the established international order-including
Brexit-that have taken place since the Cold War).

" Stephanie Soong Johnston, Time to Get Serious About OECD Global Tax Deal, Saint-Amans
Says, TAx NOTES TODAY INT'L (Oct. 27, 2020) (describing conflicts among wealthy states blocking
consensus on digital taxes).

Pitt Tax Review I ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online)
DOI 10.5195/taxreview.2021.132 I http://taxrcview.law.pittedu

A state's willingness to abide by commitments to international tax
2
cooperation represents a particularly great leap of faith. A state improves
3
national welfare by opening its borders to trade) But taxation should be a
zero-sum game. Scholars ask Which Countries Become Tax Havens? and
Why Are There Tax Havens?, but could just as easily ask why any state
24
should be relied on to pursue the carrot of global welfare.
The notion of "compliance pull" offers one explanation for that
willingness to engage in international tax cooperation in the absence of
coercive authority.2 5 As Thomas Franck explains, "the inherent capacity of a
rule to exert pressure on states to comply" derives from the rule's legitimacy
which in turn derives from a confidence that the rule serves a common
good." Legitimacy and compliance pull do not flow inevitably from an
international legal rule's virtuous aims. Rules such as the one that "makes it
improper for one state to infiltrate spies into another state in the guise of
diplomats" possess such a "low ... degree of legitimacy as to exert virtually
27
no pull towards compliance."

" Although the goals of the international tax regime, and of U.S. international tax policy
specifically, tend to be framed in terms of worldwide welfare, it seems likely that national welfare fuels

the U.S. commitment to international tax cooperation. See Graetz, supra note 1, at 1390-91 ("All of the

available evidence suggests that these policies were pursued because U.S. policymakers regarded it as in
our nation's best interests, not because they had accepted the enhancement of worldwide economic
efficiency as the appropriate policy norm.").

" See Graetz, supranote I .at 1374 ("The consensus of economists insists that a policy of free trade
not only improves worldwide efficiency but also improves the economic efficiency of each nation that
reduces trade barriers unilaterally.").
24 See Adam H. Rosenzweig, Why are There Tax Havens, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 923 (2010);
Dhammika Dharmapala & James R. Hines Jr., Which Countries Become Tax Havens?, 93 J. PUB. ECON.

1058 (2009). Assuming for a moment that cooperation would be in tax havens' interest, there are several

possible explanations for a refusal to do so. The first-and most sympathetic-paints a government of a
tax haven as a hapless victim of forces beyond its control, no better positioned to operate a reliable dragnet
for extraterritorial tax information than it is to rid itself of critical threats to public health. A second

imagines a corrupt state in which a small group of local elites profit from tax evasion or avoidance, with
few benefits trickling down to the broader public. Yet another imagines a population--perhaps
recognizable in the Brexit vote-skeptical of international cooperation in any form and leaders all too
willing to capitalize on that wariness.
2

See Franck, supra note 19, at 712.

6

id.

-

Id.
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The international tax regime has long enjoyed a very different status.
Particularly given that the benefits of international tax cooperation tend to be
diffuse while its costs can be readily quantified, states have proven
surprisingly willing to grant one another foreign tax credits and to enter into
double tax treaties. 2 8 Legitimacy and the compliance pull it generates helps
to explain why international tax cooperation has proven so attractive to states
despite a losing political formula of clear costs and opaque advantages.
The legitimacy historically enjoyed by international tax rules comes in
two distinct forms. 29 The first, input legitimacy, can be thought of as its
pedigree and traced to the process through which a legal rule takes shape. A
statute draws legitimacy from the legislature that approves it and, indirectly,
from the election of legislators themselves. The sovereignty-preserving
nature of double tax treaties-each must be individually negotiated and
ratified by representatives of states-nurtures input legitimacy. With roots
that reach back to the League of Nations, that pedigree bolsters the
international tax regime's input legitimacy.3 0
In addition, international regimes feed on their own success. The impact
of an institution's efforts can lend it a second form of legitimacy-output
legitimacy-or do the opposite. 3 1 For example, the World Health

2" Kysar, supra note 6, at 1806 (demonstrating that surprisingly
little effort has been made to
measure those costs). For the sake of comparison, if the benefits delivered via treaty were provided by

statute, such costs would be itemized on "tax expenditure budgets." See Steven A. Dean, The Tax

Expenditure Budget Is a Zombie Accountant, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 265, 289 (2012).
See FRITZ SCHARPF, GOVERNING IN EUROPE: EFFECTIVE AND DEMOCRATIC?
2 (1999)
("distinguish[ing] among two dimensions of democratic self-determination, input-oriented authenticity
(government by the people) and output-oriented effectiveness (government for the people)"); Dean, supra
note 8, at 560-63 (describing the significance of input legitimacy and output legitimacy for the
21

international tax regime).

i Franck offers the military notion of "aggressive blockade" as a rule with a "high degree of
recognized legitimacy" that "must not be violated lightly" because "they are well understood, enjoy a long
pedigree and are part of a consistent framework of rules-thejus in bello-governing and restraining the
use of force in conflicts." See Franck, supra note 19, at 707-08. Double tax treaties, albeit in a less
dramatic context, exhibit all of those characteristics.
" If an international organization acts in ways that run counter to its purposes or simply acts
in the
interests of some but not all, its output legitimacy will suffer. See Allen Buchanan & Robert O. Keohane,
The Legitimacy of Global GovernanceInstitutions, in LEGITIMACY, JUSTICE AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL

LAW 29, 45 (Lukas H. Meyer ed., 2009) ("[I]f the WTO claims to provide the benefits of trade
liberalisation to all of its members, but consistently develops policies that exclude its weaker members
from the benefits of liberalisation, this undermines its claim to legitimacy.").
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Organization's success in combating smallpox supplied it with output
32
legitimacy while its failures on AIDS did the opposite. The architects of the
century-old international tax regime cannot boast of having eradicated
smallpox, but a claim to have eradicated double taxation has gone largely
unchallenged.3 3 Over time, influential states did well for themselves
economically by embracing a neoliberal vision, providing the international
34
tax rules with an abundance of output legitimacy.
IIl. THE END OF INTERNATIONAL TAX COOPERATION'S FIRST GOLDEN AGE
35
Change has come swiftly to international tax cooperation. A vision of
legitimacy through state-to-state cooperation designed to shield the market
from procedural and substantive tax burdens collided with the hard truths of
austerity, bringing a swift end to the first golden age of international tax
cooperation. 36 A neoliberal formula yielded to an understandable scramble
37
for revenues after the 2008 Financial Crisis. Biden's 2021 "Made in
America Tax Plan" unabashedly aims to "fundamentally reorient corporate
taxation" to boost U.S. revenues.38

That shift can be seen most clearly in the 2010 U.S. Foreign Account
Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) and its skepticism of the genteel mechanisms

12 See Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperationand
Problems of Democratic Legitimacy, in EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND LEGITIMACY: THE MULTILATERAL
TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM 264, 286 (Roger B. Porter et al. eds., 2001) (using these
illustrations to explain the operation of output legitimacy).
33 Tsilly Dagan's demonstration that those treaties primarily serve to redistribute resources from
south to north without significantly affecting the overall tax burden on cross-border activities offers a

noteworthy exception. See, e.g., Dagan, supra note 2, at 980, 987.

" Double tax treaties generally receive the credit for eliminating double taxation, but may not
deserve it. Id. at 940-41 (concluding that "treaties often just replicate the mechanism that countries
unilaterally use to alleviate double taxation" while resulting in "regressive redistribution-to the benefit
of the developed countries at the expense of the developing ones").
" See generally Leaman & Waris, supra note 5.
36 See Lukas Hakelberg & Thomas Rixen, Is Neoliberalism Still Spreading? The Impact of
InternationalCooperation on Capital Taxation, REV. INT'L POL. ECON., at 4 (2020) (noting growing
discontent with respect to the dominance of neoliberalism in international taxation and its "overall aim"
of "a tax system interfering as little as possible with the 'natural' working of the market").

"Ruth Mason, The Transformation ofInternationalTax, 114 AM. J. INT'L L. 353, 364 (2020).
3 U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, THE MADE IN AMERICA TAX PLAN (Apr. 2021).
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of international tax cooperation.39 FATCA rejected the neoliberal vision and
methods that fueled the first golden age of international tax cooperation. The
I.R.S. once eliminated millions of children from U.S. tax returns by requiring
taxpayers to supply Social Security numbers for dependents. 4 FATCA's
similarly audacious approach to addressing reporting failures spurred the
creation of far-reaching global information reporting mechanisms.
Through FATCA, the United States forced private overseas firms to
provide information to U.S. tax authorities and thereby eliminated the need
for formal state-to-state cooperation. Unsurprisingly, the unorthodox style of
FATCA also "raised a number of issues" that a collective approach would
not, such as the inability of overseas actors "to comply with the reporting,
withholding and account closure requirements because of legal
restrictions." 41 The response by other states to FATCA has taken the form of
Intergovernmental Agreements (IGAs) 42 and an embrace of the OECD's
Common Reporting Standard (CRS).4 3
The CRS and IGAs reclaim the collective over the unilateral by
constructing a shared legal framework to support the bulk acquisition of
extraterritorial tax information. But neither generates the legitimacy and
compliance pull that fueled the first golden age of international tax
cooperation. An IGA allows states to intervene on behalf of the private actors
that FATCA targets and gestures towards reciprocity, but still hews closely

" Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, Pub. L. No, 111-147,
(2010).

§ 501,

124 Stat. 71, 97

" Lawrence Zelenak, The Great American Tax Novel, 110 MICH. L. REV. 969, 981 (2012)
("Requiring SSNs for dependents was actually the inspiration of John Szilagyi, an employee in the
research branch of the IRS. The idea was implemented in 1987 (following legislative authorization for the
requirement in 1986), and approximately seven million children did indeed vanish from the nation's tax
returns following implementation.").

" Press Release, U.S. Treasury Dep't, Joint Statement from the United States, France, Germany,
Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom Regarding an Intergovernmental Approach to Improving
International Tax Compliance and Implementing FATCA (Feb. 7, 2012).
42 U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, FOREIGN ACCOUNT TAX COMPLIANCE ACT (FATCA),
https://www
.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/FATCA.aspx (last visited Feb. 25, 2021) (listing
IGAs with 113 jurisdictions).

4 Itai Grinberg, The New InternationalTax Diplomacy, 104 GEO. LJ. 1137, 1150 n.46 (2016) (The
'OECD's Common Reporting Standard "builds on U.S. automatic information exchange efforts developed
under the auspices of legislation known as the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA).").
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to FATCA's asymmetric structure. As a result, an IGA imposes different
44
burdens on the United States and on its counterparts. The CRS also falls
short of the reciprocity long expected of international tax cooperation. The
most obvious problem lies in the refusal of the United States to participate in
the CRS. This undermines the notion of shared responsibility that fueled
international tax cooperation. 4 5
A less obvious-yet ultimately more important-failure reflects the
agenda-setting power of influential states. The CRS, like FATCA, supports
enforcement of the personal income tax. Most poor states rely
46
disproportionately on the corporate income tax. As a result, they derive far
less benefit from the CRS than wealthier states such as those that make up
the OECD. By failing to account for profound differences across
jurisdictions, the benefits of these recent departures from traditional
modalities of cooperation flow disproportionately to wealthy states.

IV. INTERNATIONAL TAX COOPERATION'S NEXT GOLDEN AGE
For international tax rules to enjoy the compliance pull that lent them
strength for close to a century, legitimacy remains essential. Fortunately,
through their failures, CRS and FATCA reveal a path towards a second
golden age of international tax cooperation. Their legitimacy does not rely
47
on the dated neoliberal notions that launched the first. Recognizing that

44

See Allison Christians, What You Give and What You Get: Reciprocity Under a Model

Intergovernmental Agreement on FA TCA,

I

31 CAYMAN FIN. REV. 24 (2013).

4 Given the evolution of FATCA generally, and the emergence of IGAs specifically, it is
noteworthy that Treasury lacks the ability or authority to participate in the CRS. See Stephanie Soong
Johnston, Koskinen Renews Call for Passage of Common Reporting Legislation, 151 TAX NOTES 1463
(2016) (describing I.R.S. Commissioner Koskinen's call for legislation providing U.S. tax authorities with
the authority to provide information to other states via CRS).
46 See Richard M. Bird & Eric M. Zolt, Redistribution via Taxation: The Limited Role of the
PersonalIncome Tax in Developing Countries, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1627, 1629 (2005) (observing that in
developing countries personal income taxes "often amount to little more than withholding taxes on labor
income in the formal sector" and that as a result it "plays such a small role in the tax systems of developing
countries (measured either by personal income tax revenues as a percentage of total tax revenues or by

personal income tax revenues as a percentage of GDP)").
47 See DAGAN, .supra note 11.
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CRS and FATCA reflect the priorities of the top of the global economic
pyramid invites an inversion to elevate the interests of the bottom. 48
Creating structural mechanisms that favor the least powerful states
could help to reclaim international tax cooperation's lost legitimacy. To
understand what that might mean in concrete terms, consider the minimum
taxes that have become popular in the wake of the 2017 tax law changes in
the United States that created the Global Intangible Low-Taxed Income
(GILTI) regime.49 GILTI extends FATCA's solipsistic logic by treating any
jurisdiction's claim to tax income as conditioned on its exercise. If a
jurisdiction does not use it-even if it imposes other forms of taxation-that
jurisdiction loses that right to the benefit of the United States.50
GILTI, as quintessentially American as Johnson v. M'Intosh's doctrine
of discovery, turns the right to tax into a "right of first refusal." 5 GILTI and
other minimum taxes operate by "compressing the possible tax difference
between high and low tax foreign countries."52 In that, they represent the
converse of tax sparing, which preserves a developing country's ability to set
appropriate tax rates.

" Alexander Ezenagu et al., What Should a 'New Deal on International Tax Look Like for
Developing Countries?, INT'L CTR. FOR TAX & DEV. (May 28, 2020), https://www.ictd.ac/blog/whatshould-new-deal-international-tax-look-like-developing-countries/.
49

See Budget Fiscal Year, 2018, Pub. L. 115-97,

§ 14201,

131 Stat. 2054, 2208-12.

0 The ultimate incidence of GILTI and its complex mechanisms is far from clear. Kimberly A.
Clausing, Profit Shifting Before and After the Tax Cuts andJob Act, 73 NAT'L TAX J. 1233, 1243 (2020)
(explaining that because of technical features such as cross-crediting in some cases "GILTI tax acts as a

support for the tax revenues of our trading partners").

s' Susan C. Morse, GILTI: The Co-Operative Potentialof a UnilateralMinimum Tax, 2019 BRIT.
TAX REV. 512, 519 (2019). It would be wrong to compare GILTI to genocide, but GILTI's "right of first
refusal" approach allows the United States to lay claim to revenues that traditional notions of tax policy
would assign to other states when those other states fail to demonstrate a sufficient level of civilization by

employing a U.S.-style income tax. Eric Kades, Dark Side of Efficiency: Johnson v. M'Intosh and the
Expropriation of American Indian Lands, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1065, 1073 (2000) (concluding that the
"legal rule of M'Intosh is but one piece in the large puzzle of efficient expropriation of Indian land").
52 Kimberly A. Clausing, Fixing Five Flaws of the Tax Cuts
and Jobs Act, I1 COLUM. J. TAX L.
31, 57 (2020).
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Tax sparing-a practice that can benefit developing states-has long
been controversial.5 3 In practice, tax sparing occurs when a wealthy
54
jurisdiction treats a tax that a poor state does not collect as having been paid.
The result of that willful suspension of disbelief turns the possibility of two
taxes on cross-border income into no tax at all. In theory, the arrangement
allows the developing beneficiary of tax sparing to provide incentives for
foreign investment.5 5
GILTI and other minimum taxes do the opposite, establishing an
arbitrary tax "price floor." 56 Should a poor state's tax fall short of the
prevailing baseline in terms of base or rate, a wealthy jurisdiction may
57
expand its taxing jurisdiction to fill the resulting gap. In 2000, the OECD
infamously targeted Liberia with economic sanctions after "blacklisting" the
war-ravaged nation as a tax haven.s Minimum taxes replicate that result for
jurisdictions now often termed "low tax" by allowing prosperous states to
collect revenue that should, according to traditional notions of international
tax policy, belong to others.
Where tax sparing would affirmatively shrink a wealthy jurisdiction's
right to tax, minimum taxes expand it. Both represent departures from the

s See Kim Brooks, Tax Sparing: A Needed Incentive for Foreign Investment in Low-Income
Countries or an Unnecessary Revenue Sacrifice?, 34 QUEEN'S L.J. 505, 513 -14 (2009) ("Commentators
remain sharply divided on their merits. Some emphasize their importance to low-income countries,
arguing passionately in their favour. Others adamantly oppose them, citing their futility, their potential
for abuse and other perverse effects.").
5

Id. at 511.

" See Celine Azdmara & Dhammika Dharmapala, Tax Sparing Agreements, Territorial Tax
Reforms, and Foreign Direct Investment, 169 J. PUB. ECON. 89, 108 (2019) ("We find that tax sparing
agreements are associated with an increase of up to 97% in the stock of FDL... Our results suggest that

the growth of tax sparing provisions in bilateral tax treaties can be an important tool to encourage FDI in
developing countries.").
&

" G. Charles Beller, GIL TI: "Made in America" for European Tax-Unilateral Measures
Cooperative Surplus in the International Tax Competition Game, 38 VA. TAX REV. 271, 308 (2019)
("GILTI gives non-U.S. sovereigns some pricing power on tax rate and base terms . .. because GILTI
imposes a quasi price-floor for global MNE rate and base terms.").
5 Although the tax would appear to be destined for the United States, the complex mechanics of
GILTI make it difficult to determine which country will collect the losing state's tax. See Clausing, supra

note 52, at 57 58.

" See Steven A. Dean, FA TCA, the U.S. CongressionalBlack Caucus, andthe OECD Blacklist, 99
TAx NOTES INT'L 83, 89 (2020).
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Lockean notions that generally guide international tax cooperation, but with
very different beneficiaries. 59 Although the wealthier state can have no claim
to the poor state's revenues under the benefit principle implicit in most
international tax rules, the minimum tax nevertheless seizes it. 60
The United States could easily adopt an approach that would distinguish
between states that willfully embrace low tax policies and those that lack the
resources to do otherwise. Simply put, a wealthy state collecting a minimum
tax on behalf of, say, Liberia, need not keep it. That unearned tax could be
transferred to the state that failed to collect it or, if appropriate, held in trust
for the benefit of its residents. 61 Such an approach would represent a shift
away from a tendency to punish states that fail to meet our exacting standards
on the design of tax laws.6
Complementing GILTI's stick with a carrot targeted at states too small
or poor to manage a tax system that mirrors our own would strengthen the
base of the global economic pyramid. That tax sparing 2.0 would also serve
the same anti-abuse ends as a minimum tax like GILTI. Curbing tax
avoidance while avoiding redistribution of tax revenues from poor states to
rich ones suggests a promising path towards a new golden age of
international tax cooperation.

" Implicit in nearly all international tax rules is the assumption that "each state should be entitled
to revenues derived from economic activity that occurs within its borders." Steven A. Dean, More

Cooperation, Less Uniformity: Tax Deharmonizationand the Future of the InternationalTax Regime, 84
TUL. L. REV. 125, 162 (2009). This benefits principle approach echoes the "everyday libertarianism"
criticized by Murphy and Nagel. See Leaman & Wars, supra note 5, at 3 ("Similar reservations can be
directed at the benefit principle or the equal sacrifice principle which, while distinct from a crude

libertarianism, operate according to a fundamental yardstick of proportionality without reference to the
distributional outcome of the subsequent use of fiscal resources in state expenditure."),
"5 The revenues claimed by minimum taxes are not being taxed pursuant to either residence or
source since active income is being taxed by a country other than the source country. See Avi-Yonah,

supranote 6, at 306 ("The benefits principle states that active (business) income should be taxed primarily
by the country of source, and passive (investment) income should be taxed primarily by the country of
residence. This is the famous compromise reached by the four economists at the foundation of the regime

in 1923 and is not particularly controversial.").
61 Holding the revenues in trust might be appropriate for a jurisdiction like
Liberia when the OECD
published its infamous blacklist of tax havens omitting Switzerland and including Liberia, a state that, at

the time the OECD threatened it with economic sanctions for being a tax haven, was ravaged by years of
civil war and led by a President soon to be convicted of war crimes. See Dean, supranote 58.

" See Steven A. Dean & Attiya Waris, Ten Truths About Tax Havens: Inclusion and the 'Liberia'
Problem, 70 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2021).
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CONCLUSION

In an increasingly fractious world, the neoliberalism of the first golden
age-with its utopian pursuit of economic efficiency and worldwide
welfare-will not return. But cooperation could still serve a larger purpose,
as it must if it is to draw strength from compliance pull. Creating structures
designed to preserve a robust tax base for those states with the least while
safeguarding the prerogatives of wealthy states could nurture the legitimacy
essential to another golden age of international tax cooperation. Upending
the America First logic of GILTI to strengthen the base of the global
economic pyramid could accomplish that. Implementing that tax sparing 2.0
would deliver a win-win result for residents of rich and poor states alike.
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